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WHAT
have we learned from the Com-
mission on Money and Credit about
processes and responses in monetary policy?
So far as I can see, from the Report itself,
very little —butperhaps experts in monetary
economics were not a significant part of the
audience at whom the Report was aimed. So
the most fruitful course may be to turn pri-
marily to the staff papers.
Here there is substantial evidence of the
quantity theory reborn —atleast in the sense
that money matters a good deal in determin-
ing aggregate spending on current output —
andof an important postwar change in mone-
tary theory. As noted in my introduction to
this volume, this postwar shift in theory is
centered in the "portfolio" approach to the
demand for money and other assets.In this
theory, the channels through which variations
in the money supply affect the levels of income
and employment include not only a change in
"the interest rate" but also changes in relative
pricesofallassets —realand financial —
whichin turn lead to shifts in spending on
existing assets and currently produced goods
and services. Thus in its extreme form the new
approach suggests that we need to look not at
one interest rate but at an extremely large
number, including the implied interest rates
on all real assets and including consumer goods
of any degree of durability.
In logical terms, this approach offers an
elegant rapprochement for the devotees of the
"Keynesian" and the "quantity-theory" ap-
proaches to the role of money, and for the
monetary-versus-fiscalpolicydisputessince
the 1930's.If the new look prevails, we may
look back at much of this controversy as a
good deal less significant than it has seemed
en route. The great controversy over "Is say-
ings really equal to investment?" of the late
1930's and early 1940's springs to mind.
But agreement on this mechanism doesn't
necessarily tell us how important money is
quantitatively.If we look at the staff papers
(or at least, at the sample I managed), what
does the professional support for the renais-
sance of money and monetary policy amount
to?Friedman and Meiselman, as might be
expected, plump for money as a prime de-
terminant of the level of spending on current
output, and show convincingly that a simple,
traditional monetary model versus a simple
traditional Keynesian model testgivesthe
verdict clearly to stability for velocity over
stability for the ratio of autonomous invest-
ment to income, including cases where reason-
able lags are introduced. Moreover, they go
on to spell out the portfolio balancing mech-
anismasatleastaplausible' mechanism
through which this monetary effect may be
exerted.If we take Section VI of their paper
as a statement of the "new monetary ortho-
doxy," on intellectual grounds at least a good
deal of the basis for the long quarrel between
the monetary and the Keynesian economists
has been reasoned (or compromised) away.
Few, even the most ardent neo-Keynesians,
would disagree that the impact of open market
operations may be through the spreading net
which Friedman and Meiselman spell out —
notmerely through one (bond) interest rate
alone acting on "investment" decisions. The
major challenge to the now generally accepted
fiscal policy position as our really powerful
stabilization tool becomes a strong one if a
reasonably stable demand for money is added
to the new mechanism —asat least Friedman
and Meiselman argue. The C.M.C. staff papers
contain no empirical answer to the Friedman
and Meiselman challenge to show better re-
sults with another model.
Tobin, in his paper on debt policy, provides
an elegant statement of a very similar mech-
anism through which changes in the money
stock and liquidity may influence spending de-
cisions on current output through the rebalanc-
ing of asset portfolios.
But I hope it will not be too dissident a
note to suggest that we really know very little
empirically about the validity of this descrip-
tion of the channels of monetary policy; and
that the elaborate portfolio-balancing general
equilibrium approach lacks intuitive appeal
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as a description of what most of us do in
managing our own economic affairs, so that
empirical validation becomes all the more im-
portant.Is it true that the interest rates that
matter most include whole elaborate net of
yields on assets in spreading the impact of
more money? It would be reassuring if we had
more behaviorial evidence at the micro level
to confirm the over-all empirical support ad-
vanced by Friedman and others on the new
channels of monetary policy.
The staff papers are not barren on empirical
evidence of the actual channels. Brown, Solow,
Ando, and Kareken attack the lag problem
empirically, and intriguingly seem to end up
confirming the usability of active monetary
policy to a higher degree than Friedman does,
since they assert that the lag is probably only
about six months. The multiple authors of
this paper are modest in their claims for their
results, and I fear I must agree that the results
call for such modesty. Leaving aside the now
well-argued statistical issue on comparing rates
of change against levels, the Brown, Solow,
etal.case for the six-month lag could have
been stretched a good deal either way without
much implausibility. And, on what to me is
an even more important issue —thevari-
ability of the lagneither they nor anyone
elseinthestaff papers pretends to throw
much, if any, light except on purely a priori
grounds. In my judgment the verdict has to
be:resultstilluncertain on even average
length of lags, and more evidence desperately
needed on the critical issue of variability.
Modest empirical knowledge is added on
channels of impact by Meltzer, Okun, Friend,
and Bach, who trace the spread of restrictive
policy through the banking and certain non-
bank sectors of the economy, with the con-
clusion that such restriction does not distort
seriously the otherwise established patterns of
market relationships.Friend produces direct
data that the nonbank financial intermediaries
pose less of a problem to effective monetary
policy than Shaw and Gurley and others have
claimed. Okun shows that monetary policy
seems to act effectively on certain interest
rates, and produces quantitative estimates of
the changes in rates attributable to specific
policy changes on the basis of recent experi-
ence. Brownlee and Conrad try to specify the
channels through which alternative policies act
in checking inflation and to quantify the re-
suits at different stages.
All this adds up to a good deal of support—
theoreticallyand empirically —forreestab-
lishing a major role for money and monetary
policy.But I have an uncomfortable feeling
that the foundation is not happily solid yet;
the parallel of the great intellectual faith in
money during the prosperity of the 1920'S
comes to mind. At the risk of sounding like
a Monday morning quarterback, let me con-
clude by suggesting some questions the Com-
mission's research directors might have asked
and apparently did not.
(i) To what extent historically can we
isolatecases where changes inthe money
supply were independent of the public's spend-
ing and output decisions?Given the agreed
close correlation between the two, we need to
establish whether changes in the money stock
were really caused by changes in economic
activity rather than vice versa.I suspect we
may find that supply changes can be estab-
lished as quite independent in many important
cases, such as the big inflations and depres-
sions, though much less clearly so in minor
fluctuations. Cagan and Friedman may have
these answers forusintheirforthcoming
volumes.
(2) To what extent can the monetary au-
thorities actually control the stock of spend-
able money (currency and demand deposits)
by controlling the total volume of currency
and deposits, which isall they have within
their proximate power through their control
over reserves?Over long periods and with
comparable interest rates, the relation of time
deposits to total currency plus deposits looks
pretty stable. But for short periods, the rela-
tionship obviously may be very unstable, as in
recent years.
(3) Lastly, and perhaps most important,
which model (in a sophisticated form that
makes its proponents happy) really gives the
best results —abasically "monetary" model
oran"income-expenditures"modelwith
money explicitly built in?Ultimately itis
through development and careful testing of
two or three more complex models against onePROCESSES AND RESPONSES IN MONETARY CONTROL
another and against Friedman's models that
we can hope to reach reasonable professional
consensus on just how important money is and
how it works on the major ultimate variables.
The new look in monetary theory is intel-
lectually attractive. What we need most now




The Report of the Commission on Money
and Credit does not, in my judgment, fully
deserve the caustic criticisms directed at it by
Martin Bronfenbrenner in his paper. It is true
that the Report is quite fuzzy in places and
that the analysis not infrequently bears little
relation to the ensuing recommendations.It
deals inadequately with policy objectives and
glosses over the difficulties arising out of con-
flicts between objectives, and it is wishy-washy
on the balance-of-payments problem. But, in
spite of its weaknesses, I believe it is a valu-
able document which contains many useful
recommendations. I happen to agree with the
philosophy underlying the Report on such
matters as the need for greater executive dis-
cretion in fiscal policy and on the choice of the
proper mix of monetary and fiscal policies.
Some of the recommendations relating to
the relaxation of portfolio and interest-rate
restrictions applicable to financial institutions
would, I suspect, be accepted by practically
everyoneattendingthisconference.If
adopted, these recommendations would increase
efficiency in the allocation of capital and per-
haps modestly strengthen monetary policy.
Some of us would want to go further than the
Commission does and allow commercial banks
to pay interest on demand deposits.
It seems to me that it is much too early to
judge the impact of the Report on economic
policy —indeedit may never be possible to
assessits impact with much precision.Its
publicationwas undoubtedlyasignificant
factor in encouraging the Kennedy Administra-
tion to put before Congress proposals for in-
creasing the President's discretioninfiscal
policy, proposals which parallel quite closely
certain of the recommendations of the Com-
mission.In addition, the President has ap-
pointed three interagency working groups to
follow up and appraise the Commission's pro-
posals relating to (x) regulation of banks and
other financial institutions, (2) federal lend-
ing and loan guarantee programs, and
privatepension funds.Even ifthe recom-
mendations of the Commission are not im-
mediately adopted, itis quite possible that
the Report may help to set in motion a process
of reappraisal which will eventually produce
some important changes.
Processes and Responses in Monetary Policy
The conclusions concerning monetary policy
do not appear to be based to any appreciable
extent on new knowledge that was uncovered in
the course of the study. The Commission sur-
veyed the same ground that others of us have
gone over, and it encountered the same difficul-
ties.Since many of the issues are quite tech-
nical and since the Commission was, for the
most part, composed of persons who are not
specialists in monetary policy, one may suppose
that the conclusions it arrived at emanated
largely from the staff and the advisory board.
Here and there the Report makes reference to
shreds of new evidence, but —andI found this
annoying —inno case was the precise nature
or source of this evidence disclosed.
After expressing general confidence in the
effectiveness of monetary policy, the Report
goes on to recognize that, except in the area of
residential construction, firm evidence of its
effects is quite limited. As a consequence, the
Report places considerable emphasis on the
influence of monetary policy working through
changes in the availability of credit and through
changes in attitudes and expectations and on
secondary interindustry and macro effects. The
Commission's proposals for strengthening mon-
etary policy include abandonment of the "bills
only" policy, some streamlining of the admin-132 PROCESSES AND RESPONSES IN MONETARY CONTROL
istrative apparatus of the Federal Reserve, sug-
gestions that VA and FHA mortgage credit
terms be varied countercyclically, and that the
government investigate the possibility of de-
vising selective controls in the fields of inven-
tory investment and business plant and equip-
ment expenditures. In contrast to the rather
bold attitude adopted by the Commission in
the field of fiscal policy, no very startling de-
partures from the status quo were recommended
for monetary policy.
Unfortunately, I have not seen all the re-
search papers prepared for the use of the Com-
mission that relate to problems of monetary
policy, and I have not yet had sufficient time to
study thoroughly all those I have seen.It is
my general impression, however, that most of
the papers do not provide a great deal of new
evidence concerning the effects produced by
monetary controls. One reason for this is that
many of the papers were not intended to break
new ground but merely to summarize the exist-
ing state of knowledge. Presumably, the Com-
mission took the view that path-breaking new
research on the effectsof monetary policy
would not be especially helpful, given the time
limitations under which it was operating. Of
necessity, a number of papers had to be com-
missioned on subjects related to the tools and
mechanics of monetary policy.In addition,
summaries of existing knowledge were pre-
pared relating to the determinants of consump-
tion expenditures, plant and equipment outlays,
residential construction, and soon.These
papers are, in general, well done and are of
considerable value. However, since, up to now,
there has been little success in isolating the
effectsofinterest ratesor other monetary
variables, the contributions of these studies to
the Commission's appraisal of monetary policy
were for the most part quite negative.
Some of the research papers do, however,
attempt to break new ground concerning the
effects of monetary policy. On the theoretical
side, there is a notable contribution by Tobin
which presents a unified approach to questions
of monetary policy and debt management
focused around portfolio adjustments of inves-
tors.1 Of the empirical studies I have seen, the
1James Tobin, "An Essay on the Principles of Debt
Management," preliminary version, ig6o.
two that present new evidence most relevant
to the assessment of the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy are a study of lags by Brown, So-
low, Ando, and Kareken,2 and a quantitative
study of the effects of monetary and debt
operations on interest rates by Okun.3
The Brown, Solow, Ando, and Kareken study
breaks down the lag in monetary policy as
follows: (i) the "inside" lag between the need
for action and the Federal Reserve's response;
(2)thelag between action by the Federal
Reserve and the effect on interest rates and
credit terms experienced by private spending
units;and the"outside" lag between
changes in interest rates and credit terms and
the effect on real output. The most notable
contribution of the study lies in the effort to
estimate the outside lag.The study deals
separately with fixed investment in nonelectri-
cal machinery and with inventory investment.4
The study of fixed investment uses new or-
ders for nonelectrical machinery as the decision
variable that is influenced by interest rates —
thatis, the model is based on the rationale that
interest rates affect orders with a lag and that
production is adjusted to orders with a further
lag.Several types of distributed lags having
different time patterns are tried out, and new
orders are found to depend on the index of in-
dustrial production, corporate profits, and the
industrial bond yield. The interest elasticity
of investment (at the point of means) is found
to be about —to— However,the effects
are somewhat stretched out in time, with about
45 per cent occurring in the quarter in which a
change in interest rates takes place, 25per
cent in the next quarter, and around 15 per
cent in the third quarter —thus,about 85 per
cent of the total effect occurs within three
quarters or so.
To the lag between changes in interest rates
and changes in orders must be added the lag
between changes in orders and changes in pro-
duction. Again using a relationship containing
'E. Cary Brown, Robert M. Solow, Albert Ando, and
John H. Kareken, "Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy,"
preliminary version.
' M.Okun, Monetary Policy, Debt Management
and InterestRates: A QuantitativeAppraisal,Cowles
Foundation Discussion Paper 125, June 21, 1961.
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a distributed lag, the conclusions are roughly
that i7 per cent of the effect of a change in
orders is reflected in production of machinery
within three months, 30 per cent within six
months, and about 50 per cent within the first
year.
While these results are somewhat tentative,
they do strongly suggest (i) that the ultimate
effect of a change in the long-term interest rate
on fixed investment may be quite substantial,
but (2)thatthese effects are spread out over a
considerable period of time, thereby creating
a troublesome problem of timing for the mon-
etary authorities.
With regard to inventory investment, the
study employs a modified inventory accelerator
type of equation and indicates that the elastic-
ity of demand for inventories (total accum-
ulated change in stock) with respect to the
average interest rate on short-term bank loans
is about —.4.However, there is again a dis-
tributed lag involved, with the result that about
one-quarter of the total inventory investment
will take place within one quarter after the
change in the interest rate, about two-thirds by
the end of four quarters, and about nine-tenths
by the end of eight quarters. This again sug-
gests serious problems of timing in using mon-
etary policy to control inventory investment.
The Brown, Ct aL, study has some shortcom-
ings, and the authors are careful to emphasize
the tentative nature of their findings.In the
case of fixed investment, the difficulties include:
failure to take account of supply conditions in
the capital goods industry, which would surely
condItion the response of production to a
change in interest rates; and inability to make
allowance for the fact that the lags involved
will vary with the state of expectations and the
stock of inventories held by capital goods pro-
ducers. But since the lags in the effects of mon-
etary policy and the size of the responses that
occur are very important and interrelated mat-
ters, this study is representative of the type of
work that needs to be done if our knowledge of
the working of monetary policy is to be signifi-
cantly increased. In addition to further exten-
sion of this work on plant and equipment and
inventory investment, similar studies are need-
ed in other areas, such as residential construc-
tion, and state and local government expendi-
tures.
Okun's study is a quarterly analysis which
attempts to estimate the effects of various mon-
etary and debt operations on the short-term
interest rate (Treasury bill rate) and the long-
term interest rate (yield on long-term Treasury
bonds). The analysis is so formulated as to
permit quantitative estimates of the effects on
the two interest rates that would result from
open market operations in debt of various
maturities, changes in reserve requirements,
changes in the Federal Reserve discount rate,
changes in the level of income, and operations
by the Treasury or Federal Reserve that change
the maturity composition of the publicly-held
debt.
The most striking conclusion of the Okun
studyisthat debt management operations
which change the maturity composition of a
given debt have very weak effects.Several
alternative sets of equations are presented, but
a typical conclusion is that the retirement of
$r billion of Treasury bills and the simulta-
neous issuance of $i billion of 20-year bonds will
lower the bill rate by about two basis points and
raise the long-term rate by less than one basis
point. In general, the study suggests that the
maturity structure of interest rates is primarily
determined by the interest rate expectations of
private lenders and borrowers and is not very
sensitive to changes in the relative supplies of
debt of different maturities —aconclusion that
accords well with the results of other recent
work on the determinants of the interest rate
structure, such as that of David Meiselman.
As Okun points out, his study suggests that the
issue of "bills only" was not nearly so impor-
tant as many of us thought it to be.
In addition to its implications with respect
to the interest rate structure, the Okun study
also indicates that rather large monetary opera-
tions are needed to produce substantial changes
in the level of interest rates. For instance, a
typical result is that open market sales of bills,
notes, or other short-term issues in the amount
of some $6 billion will be needed to raise the
long-term interest rate by 50 basis points.
Nearly the same volume of sales of 20-year
bonds would be needed to produce the same'34
result. The conclusion seems to be, as Okun
points out, that vigorous action is necessary if
monetary policy is to accomplish much.
The studies by Brown, Solow, Ando, and
Kareken and by Okun are certainly by no
means the last word on their respective topics.
However, they do seem to me to typify the kind
of quantitative research that is necessary if
our understanding of monetary phenomena is
to be significantly improved.
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